Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace 1812–1822 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957)
Henry A. Kissinger presents the myriad problems of reestablishing a European balance of power after Napoleon and his Grande Armee tore through the continent. Since its publication in 1957, Kissinger has become one of the world’s preeminent diplomats and international policy scholars of the twentieth century. He is perhaps best known for implementing the détente foreign policy of the Nixon and Ford administrations in the 1970s. Throughout this book, which is based on his PhD dissertation, Kissinger lays out the general principles of the balance-of-power and realist diplomacy that characterized his policies as National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. A German Jewish refugee of the 1930s, Kissinger served in World War II as a member of the U.S. Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps, experienced firsthand the extreme upheavals of the twentieth century, and sought to draw lessons from the past to apply to the burgeoning post-World War II world order. Though he is writing about the early nineteenth century, it is apparent throughout the book—and explicitly stated upfront—that Kissinger was analyzing the peacemakers of 1812 through the lens of atomic diplomacy in 1957.
Kissinger has produced a profound study of how leading diplomats Prince Klemens von Metternich of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Viscount Robert Castlereagh from Great Britain negotiated and constructed Europe’s new balance of power based on legitimate order in the wake of Napoleon’s failed invasion of Russia. British aims were representative of an island and maritime power that feared a continent united under a single ruler. Castlereagh was concerned primarily with a powerful France, otherwise ignoring Russian plans to dominate Central Europe. On the other hand, Metternich and his counterparts on the continent represented states that sought a “legitimate” equilibrium of order that would ensure peace and prosperity. These primary agents ushered in a new “Concert of Europe” that created a legitimate international order that all significant powers agreed upon and which resulted in nearly one hundred years of continental peace outside of the 1853–1856 Crimean War, the 1866 Austro-Prussian War, and the 1870–71 Franco-Prussian War. This new system was Metternich’s answer to the radical upheavals of the late eighteenth century that brought decades of revolutionary liberalism, death, and destruction. Metternich sought to preserve Europe’s status quo through legitimacy to ensure the long-term stability of Europe’s five great powers. He depicts Metternich as a subtle yet tenacious mastermind as he moved Austria from its alliance with France to a member of the Allied coalition by using Napoleon’s psychology against him. Metternich’s machinations in unencumbering his country from its compulsory alliance with France set the conditions for the quadruple alliance to defeat Napoleon and restore order and legitimacy in Europe.
Kissinger argues that the Metternich system hinged on order and equilibrium; though not necessarily fair, it was mutually accepted as legitimate. This concept of legitimacy is critical to Kissinger’s work, and he defines it as “no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and the permissible aims of foreign policy” (1). Therefore, each state must accept the new order and see its legitimacy for it to work; if one power does not view the international order as legitimate, they will challenge that order. Accepting this legitimacy is driven through equilibrium and a balance of power among states. Unlike agreements of the past, the system established at the Congress of Vienna ushered in several decades of international peace and perpetuated the survival of several empires that teetered on the brink of destruction, a parallel to the atomic age not lost on Kissinger.
Kissinger’s source base centers on the official papers of each prominent actor, especially those of Castlereagh and Metternich, which leads to a focus on those actors at the expense of others. These sources are also published collections rather than deep archival research. Regardless, this book is a timeless study of the machinations of diplomatic strategy and contains many lessons for the modern strategist. War has always been an extension of politics, and forging a lasting peace is often much more complex than prosecuting a war itself. Politicians and diplomats must understand the nuanced factors that drive international decision-making and the complex factors involved in coalition-building to maintain legitimate world order. The lessons of this era are significant today as a grand coalition faces another imperial leader convinced of his invincibility. As Metternich and Castlereagh before them, leaders now should be preparing for a peace that ensures the legitimacy of international equilibrium across Europe. This book is incredibly useful for various audiences, but due to its dry and complex diplomatic vocabulary, it is probably best suited for academics, diplomats, and politicians well-versed in the language of international relations.