The Airborne Mafia focuses on the creation and transmission of values, beliefs, and norms from one subculture to the larger Army bureaucracy and the impact of that subculture on Cold War institutional development and national security. In this book project, I argue that World War II airborne officers cemented a unique set of values, beliefs, and norms that I call “airborne culture” as they commanded their units in that war. As these officers ascended to the highest ranks of the army, they transmitted this culture throughout their service.
The Airborne Mafia refers to a group of radical forward-thinking officers that created airborne units during World War II and were subsequently in charge of the entire United States Army in the 1950s. Exploring the development of a distinctive airborne mindset through the lens of organizational culture, my book shows that this tactical-level subculture thrust its leaders to prominence and undergirded significant strategic, tactical, and cultural changes during the Cold War.
The triumvirate of Ridgway, Taylor, and Gavin had all worked together in the formative years of the airborne experiment, and each had served as airborne division commanders in World War II. Their service in those positions brought them fame that, together with their ambition, elevated these officers to the highest positions of army leadership.
All three were forward-thinking West Point graduates known for their bravery, intelligence, and role in leading a brand-new dangerous experiment—the airborne division. All three were likewise committed to the idea that the ground soldier remained more important to modern warfare than machines, a stark contrast to a Department of Defense increasingly enamored by the infatuation with technology and atomic weapons to end wars quickly or prevent them altogether. Their rise to the top of the army was set against the backdrop of Cold War international competition with the Soviet Union.
To fight a war of rapid movement required self-reliant and flexible troops. In building a large segment of the military to parachute behind enemy lines, airborne leaders cultivated values, beliefs, and norms different than the rest of the army as it learned how to train its men. This mindset manifested itself in how these airborne organizations behaved.
And later, in the twenty years between World War II and the Vietnam War the atomic bomb and the ability to deliver it through the air drove much of military thought. For the first time in American history, the United States maintained a large standing military in a permanent state of readiness. In a time when technology was believed to rule the day, many advocates from outside the army thought they could win wars without committing ground forces.
Army leaders—and particularly the Airborne Mafia—resisted technology-based solutions that might render their service obsolete and understood that wars were fought by humans on the ground, requiring the control of territory to force one’s enemy to capitulate. Exploring postwar thinking and organizational change helps illuminate where the Army was headed in those critical moments after World War II, and how the airborne guided its path. These reorganization efforts—the Pentomic Division and the Strategic Army Corps—reflect the Army’s conflicting values and missions during the Eisenhower era.
Airborne culture has remained a significant part of the United States Army since its inception. The Airborne Mafia started as a small cadre of radical thinkers that insisted that the fusion of air and land power was critical to future warfare. Since 1940, airborne units have imparted their unique way of fighting and leading on the rest of the army. The cultural tenets identified throughout this work, those of exceptionalism, flexibility, adaptability, innovation, inspired leadership, decentralization, and individuality, have permeated the army and allowed airborne leaders to institutionalize their specialty as a critical component of the army despite a lessening requirement for large-scale airborne operations.
The airborne has always been more than just a means of delivery to the battlefield, and its importance in the larger army outweighed mere tactical concerns. The very nature of airborne operations required personnel to be mentally prepared to face danger before facing the enemy—jumping from an aircraft in flight carried a high level of uncertainty. As a result, the image of the paratrooper became synonymous with the army’s elite, as it has in many other armies around the world.
This is the story of how one group of leaders institutionalized their concepts into a quasi-branch on par with armor, artillery, infantry, or engineers. Yet the airborne was comprised of people from all branches. By reaching a degree of institutionalization that cemented the airborne concept into army operational doctrine while airborne officers rose to prominence, the Airborne Mafia imbued their values, beliefs, and norms into a service-wide culture. This rise allowed these key leaders and their subordinates to enact institutional changes that reflected their ideas about how to fight.