Review of Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands

Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1983)

Biography: Hastings is a British journalist and military historian who has written extensively on conflicts around the world. He once was editor-in-chief of The Daily Telegraph. Simon Jenkins is another journalist and editor who has also written a plethora of works on everything from history and politics to architecture in England. 

Overview: A sweeping narrative history on the political and military pieces that make up the Battle of the Falklands. Hastings was embedded with the British task force sent to re-take the islands while Jenkins was covering events in London. Hasting covered the war for the London Standard and then interviewed returnees; Jenkins, political editor of The Economist, covered the war’s political beat and the prior diplomatic-ups-and-downs. 

Central Thesis: The book is the story of what the authors called “almost certainly the last colonial war that Britain will ever fight. It is a narrative history that accounts for British political decision making and the naval and military operations to secure the islands again as a British protectorate. They argue that the operation was under the guise that this was what the Falklanders wanted and that under UN mandate for self-determination of peoples, the British were justified. 

Scope of Book: The book shows how, 28,000 British men and women moved 8,000 miles to fight on a tiny relic of Britain’s imperial past. At the time, many Britons saw it as a tragic absurdity, but the British victory confirmed the quality of British arms and boosted the political fortunes of the Conservative government. 

  • The authors are convinced that this was a war that shouldn’t have happened: the Falklanders should have accepted the “lease-back” agreement; the Argentines acted only because they didn’t think the British would send their fleet; the British never believed the Argentines would actually invade the islands.
  • They begin with an excellent overview on the history of the islands and claims upon them. Argentina’s leadership made a grave error, yet they also blame Thatcher for not trying harder to force the Argentine’s hands. 
  • Jenkins and Hastings acknowledge that the question of sovereignty is somewhat ambiguous, with the islanders right to self-determination the only strong argument in favor of the British claim.
  • The logistics of the operation were a key consideration, sending an expeditionary force 8000 miles away against an enemy basically on its home turf will be difficult. 
  • The British were quite lucky in this engagement. They underestimated Argentine air strength and launched their assault at San Carlos without having achieved air superiority, but bad weather kept the Argentine planes away. On the next day weather cleared and the Argentine air force took its toll on the Royal Navy. The inadequacy of British ship design became all too clear, but not, the authors say, because of the infamous aluminum superstructures. They place most of the blame on the concentration of vital functions in a single area of the ships, and on inadequate defense against air attack.
  • The land attack was similarly lucky. For example, after 2 Para made the initial landings at San Carlos, their battle for Goose Green was against an enemy four times their strength. The hastily mounted attack succeeded only because of the quality of the British soldiers.
  • Luck also played a role as the Royal Marines’ of 3 Commando had a NATO responsibility for northern Norway, so they were well-trained for conditions on the Falklands. 
  • Similar luck prevailed in fights across the mountains and for the territorial capital of Stanley where the authors surmise that the Argentine army failed because of inherent distrust of their conscripts and an inability to grasp the principles of strategy.
  • The book is organized with back and forth chapters on the operation and the politics. It includes very helpful order of battle charts and timeline.
  • The depiction of the land battles is vivid but spare, and highly effective. The uncertainty of war, the reality that is never quite what was expected, is beautifully portrayed.
  • The book does not give much to Argentinian agency or perspective, as it is a very clearly written by British journalists. It treats the operation critically throughout. 

Commentary: Very well written account of the war for the Falkland’s, which as the title suggests isn’t much more than a battle. The diplomatic parts are dry, but necessary. Because it was written contemporaneously with the events unfolding, it has an almost flash news report feel to it. Overall an excellent “first draft” of history that the authors call an interim report based on the testimony of participants.