David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare (London: Praeger Security International, 1964)
Biography: David Galula was born in French governed Tunisia and graduated from St. Cyr in 1939. Dismissed from the French army because of his ethnicity in 1941, he joined the Free French movement. He served in the French Army in Northern Africa, Italy, and France during WWII as well as in China, Greece, and Indochina. After resigning from the French Military, Galula served as a research assistant at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs where he put this book together.
Thesis: Galula explains the facets of “Revolutionary War.” He defines it as the combination of insurgency and counterinsurgency operations generally found in the colonial or semi-colonial world. He argues for a population centric counterinsurgency theory. This book is foundational to current US military counterinsurgency doctrine as seen in FM 3-24. The idea that the military cannot or should not handle “political” and civil support actions, is fallacious as each affect the other. For Galula you defeat an insurgency by controlling the population. The objective is to win the support of the people. For insurgents, they must transition eventually to a legitimate state government.
Scope of Book:
Revolutionary War (Chapter 1):
Revolutionary War is primarily an internal conflict, although external influences seldom fail to bear upon it. Insurgency is the pursuit of the policy of a party, inside a country by every means (3). These are the tenants of a Revolutionary War: It is political, protracted, it is cheap, and offers the insurgent great flexibility than the counterinsurgents. It begins long before actual violence occurs. The insurgents have the strategic advantage. He concludes with “an insurgent or counterinsurgent… conducting a war in opposition to these characteristics would certainly not increase his chances for success.” (10)
Prerequisites for Insurgency (Chapter 2):
A Cause that must potentially attract a maximum and repel a minimum (Castro in Cuba, Communist Chinese as successful examples) A insurgency assess the Strengths and Weakness of the political regime in place (Absences of problems, national consensus, political structure, counterinsurgents knowledge of counterinsurgency warfare, the resoluteness of the counterinsurgency leadership. Human/Physical Geography (Climate, ethnic breakdown, international borders, Population size, Economy) is important and finally the level of outside support (moral, political, material, military).
Insurgency Doctrine (Chapter 3):
The Orthodox (Maoist) Pattern: 1. Create a Party. 2. Build a United Front. 3. Guerrilla Warfare 4. Movement Warfare 5. Annihilation Campaign (steps 1 and 2 are generally nonviolent and benign/legal to national government. (Think Chinese Civil War)
The Bourgeois-Nationalist patter (shortcut): 1. Blind Terrorism 2. Selective Terrorism (these two steps replace/enhance the nonviolent or legal means of the first two steps of the Maoist Pattern.
COIN in the Cold/Hot Revolutionary War (Chapter 4/5)
Revolutionary wars are divided into two phases for Counterinsurgents: The Cold (first two phases of Maoist Pattern) and Hot (3rd and 4th phases of the Maoist Pattern). Counterinsurgents have four options during the Cold phase: 1) Direct action against Insurgents, 2) indirect action against insurgents via eliminating the cause of their frustration, 3) infiltrating the insurgent, and 4) strengthen the states political machine (expand patronage). In the Hot Phase Counterinsurgents should support the population, galvanize an active minority to support the Counterinsurgents. Popular support is conditional based on Counterinsurgents actions and finally don’t try to win everywhere at once.
From Strategy to Tactics (Chapter 6):
There must be a single direction/focus for military, political and judicial task and it must be lead by political not military leadership. Military forces should be adapted to counterinsurgency warfare (light infantry, helicopters, refined rules of engagement). Counterinsurgents must continuously reassess what is successful versus what is not based on the location and other factors.
Operations (Chapter 7): He provides 8 steps for operations to defeat insurgents beginning with isolating/destroying the insurgent forces both politically and militarily and ending with legitimizing the pro-government populace and party. Step 1: destruction of the guerrilla forces (or expulsion). Step 2: Deployment of the static unit—forces must switch attention from the guerrillas to the population and this step roughly equates to using forces to keep the guerrillas from coming back. Step 3: Contact with and control of the population. Step 4: Destruction of the insurgent political organization. Step 5: Local elections. Step 6: Testing the local leaders. Step 7: Organizing a party. Step 8: Winning over or suppressing the last guerrillas.
Commentary: A short, quick read that is well organized and places his ideas into a format that any practitioner can pick up and understand. The effect this has had on American counterinsurgency doctrine is clear throughout.