Between 1905 and 1914, the various powers in Europe and the United States developed air power at a much different rate. During this period, the United States lagged behind significantly in air power development primarily because there was not a glaring need for its development, whereas in Europe, war was on the horizon. European development outpaced that of the United States between 1905 and 1914 because of military rivalry and nationalistic fervor, which combined with a persistent security dilemma and conflicts to test its development, spurred active air power development in Europe.
The intention of preliminary aircraft use was primarily as observation platforms for both reconnaissance and directing artillery fires. In this case, both the United States and the European powers were effective at developing air power because their aircraft were able to accomplish this mission, albeit imperfectly, by the beginning of the First World War. However, the European military establishments were able to develop this capability quicker and effectively than the United States.
Invented and first flown in the United States, the heavier aircraft was slow to develop on this side of the Atlantic. Competition between manufacturers coupled with a lack of reason for development resulted in the slower development of air power in the United States. While the Wright Brothers had invented the heavier-than-air flying machine, the presence of other competitors resulted in many distractions for the Wrights during this time. The United States government had just spent $50,000 on Samuel Langley’s experiment with heavier-than-air aircraft at the turn of the century and were thus hesitant to invest further in the concept. After rejecting proposals in 1908, 1909, and 1911, the military was not involved in aircraft development in the United States until 1912. Until 1911, the U.S. Army only had one Wright Flyer. According to Gross, 1912 was a benchmark year in United States military aviation because the U.S. government allocated $125,000 to its development. However, this still pales in comparison to Europeangovernment air power investment.
Furthermore, during this period in the United States, the military had little reason to invest in new technology. The Frontier had been “closed” since 1890, and with no current security dilemma, the United States saw very little use for this new military technology. Aviation not only appeared unnecessary, but it was also dangerous: eight of fourteen U.S. Army pilots perished in crashes in 1912. Perfectly content with existing technologies, it was not until the siege and occupation of Vera Cruz in 1914 that the United States used aircraft in a military role, this time as observers for naval gunfire. Further employment in the chasing of Pancho Villa in 1916 nearly ended in disaster for the 1st Aero Squadron as the combination of high altitude and desert air rendered the Air Service useless.
Aviation advocates in the United States faced an uphill battle at developing air power before the U.S. entered World War I in 1917. Senior leaders in the United States military were naturally skeptical of aviation’s capabilities. Despite the interventions in Mexico, the United States was at peace with the great powers and thus had no incentive to modernize. By its entry into the Great War in 1917, U.S. airpower found itself in an ‘embryonic state’ leading up to its entry into The Great War.
In Europe, the great powers managed to develop air power rather quickly. A persistent security dilemma in Europe and early conflicts in which to test and display its capabilities were the perfect situation in which to spur development. Ironically, the catalyst for air power development in Europe was the Wright Brothers. When they arrived in France in 1908 and demonstrated their capabilities, their flyer easily outpaced any flying machine built in Europe at the time. Furthermore, nationalism and militarism arose in Europe after a century of warfare and led to a much grander investment in air power than anything in the United States.
Throughout the 19th Century, continental Europe experienced the first Napoleon’s total war conquest across the continent and spent the rest of the century in a state of nearly perpetual conflict. Between 1815 and 1914 there was a conflict involving at least one European power nearly every year. Warfare was what Europeans had come to expect. Military innovation is how one stays ahead of their rivals, and air power represented the next new great idea if a bit ancillary at the time. Of course, this new technology would need to survive the crucible of combat.
Conflicts in the early teens proved to be those testing grounds. Europeans first saw the potential of the flying machine as an instrument of war during the 1911–12 Italo-Turk war in Libya. Reports of Italian success using air power against Turkish forces in Africa motivated British development. The Balkan Wars, fought between 1912 and 1913, was a precursor to the Great War and foreshadowed many future uses of aircraft, especially reconnaissance. Despite its early use by the Italians and Balkan states, these relatively small nations did not have the economic capital to develop their air power much further, and by the First World War, traditional rivals France and Germany had the most advanced air services.
The United States and Europe developed air power at a much different rates due to the respective circumstances of each region. The irony is that American inventors of heavier-than-air flight were the very people who spurred the initial burst of development in Europe. At the outbreak of the First World War, air power in Europe outpaced that of the United States. Despite its massive industrial potential, as the United States entered the war, it consistently relied upon European equipment as its economic and industrial bases scrambled to match its European counterparts. Between 1905 and 1914, military rivalry and nationalistic fervor combined with a persistent security dilemma and conflicts to test its development spurred effective air power development in Europe.
