Adrian Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars (London: Cassell & Co, 2000)
Mostly famous today for Hannibal’s incredible march across the Alps with elephants, the three successive Punic Wars across the third and second century BCE resulted in a monumental shift in the balance of power in the Western Mediterranean, and the course of history since. A series of conflicts that erupted similar to the Peloponnesian War that preceded it, or the three Franco-German contests of the 19th and 20th centuries, the Punic Wars also represents an ideal case study in strategic decision making. Adrian Goldsworthy’s The Punic Wars is perhaps the best single-volume treatment of the three wars that resulted in Rome’s rise to power as the dominant force in the Mediterranean. Goldsworthy is a prolific writer and one of the preeminent scholars of Ancient Rome, authoring thirteen works on the subject.
According to Goldsworthy, one of the most critical facets of Rome’s rise in Italy was its willingness to extend citizenship to those who lived in conquered provinces. The author opens the book with a chapter comparing both belligerents’ military and political systems. Citizenship meant different things to different groups of people in Rome, but Goldsworthy argues that it laid the groundwork for a mass conscript army that, alongside massive logistical resources, proved decisive in defeating Carthage. The size of its military, combined with a propensity toward civic service and harsh discipline, allowed the Roman Army to weather large-scale casualties to ultimately triumph in the war. On the other hand, the Carthaginians did not rely on a robust citizen conscript army and instead had to rely on mercenaries and allies to fill their ranks. Both military systems took time to turn raw recruits and newly received allies into fully functioning armies, but the Roman system and its seemingly endless supply of people was far superior.
For example, following disaster at Cannae in 16 BCE, Rome managed to immediately field another field army and bring its massive resources to bear. The Romans exhausted Hannibal in a war of attrition, particularly after cutting him off from his brother’s resupply efforts, culminating in Roman victory at the Metaurus, before going on the offensive and invading Africa, finally defeating Hannibal at Zama in 202 BCE. Goldsworthy surmises that Roman institutions, and their ability to focus manpower and resources across multiple theaters through its political organization, social structure, and military institutions, proved insurmountable.
Maintaining an adaptable strategy emerges as the critical lesson of Rome’s experience in the Punic Wars. Goldsworthy’s book highlights that when a state can constantly reassess its assumptions and adjust its available ways, means, and even ends, it will succeed against a less flexible foe. In the case of Rome, their ability to develop into a naval power during the First Punic War, commit to a long-term delaying strategy that was contrary to their aggressive ideals of war in the Second, and annihilate Carthage via a three-year siege in the Third proved critical to their long-term success. Goldsworthy credits the famous Fabian strategy that sought to delay pitched battle as critical to giving Rome the necessary time and space to reconstitute their forces after defeat at Trebia and Lake Trasimene. Nevertheless, according to Goldsworthy the Second Punic War was “a simple contest for domination between rival states,” that marked a turning point in Rome’s ability to dominate the entire Mediterranean (357). The ultimate destruction of Carthage in the Third Punic War coincided with the destruction of Corinth in the same year to secure Roman domination of the entire Mediterranean.
Organized into four distinct parts, one for each of the three wars plus the comparative introduction mentioned above, Goldsworthy sets the reader up with a wealth of knowledge to better understand the minutia of the war. The author relies on the usual ancient sources such as Livy, Polybius, Diodorus, and Plutarch while highlighting the potential problems with these ancient works. However, he spends a good portion of the book interlacing the complex ways the various ancient authors diverge. However, this practice is something seemingly best suited to a broad historiographical section before moving on to the author’s analysis. Despite these issues, Goldsworthy’s impressive understanding of Roman military operations shines in this book. His treatment of Roman military theory and thought and his ability to recreate detailed accounts of pivotal battles is exceptional. Because of the wealth of information presented, this book is ideal for scholars of ancient or military history that need a one-book primer on these conflicts. The similarities between the Punic Wars and the 20th century World Wars make this indispensable reading. A deep study of the Punic Wars is as essential to understanding the nature of strategy in the Ancient Mediterranean as it is the nature of strategy today.