Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1998)
A comprehensive overview of the American military experience in the First World War, Edward M. Coffman’s The War to End All Wars takes the reader on a journey through America’s prosecution of World War I. From a fledging great power attempting to manage preparations, to a 4 million–man military establishment by war’s end, this is a story of a nation coming of age. A preeminent First World War scholar who wrote this book during his tenure as a history professor at the University of Wisconsin, Coffman envisioned the project while researching the career of the World War I US Army Chief of Staff, Peyton C. March. Coffman wrote this book to examine all aspects of the war, from mobilization and logistics, to trench warfare, to anti-submarine and convoy operations, and to the new field of aerial warfare. (p. vii)
Coffman argues that American mobilization was decisive to the outcome of the First World War and concludes that “the Allies couldn’t have won without their help.” (p. 364) Sending millions of men to the Western Front regardless of their readiness status, the United States provided what the Allies needed to overcome their German adversaries. Hampered by a lack of equipment to train such vast quantities of manpower, the US Army nevertheless sent droves of men across the Atlantic. US forces began to make a difference in the war effort by the summer of 1918. Thanks to considerable assistance from the British and French, who provided needed transport, equipment, and expertise, the American Expeditionary Forces’ presence eventually shifted the numerical balance in favor of the Allies.
Coffman highlights the slow growth of the American Expeditionary Forces from just a few divisions of potential individual replacements for Allied units, through the issue of amalgamation, to an independent field army by the late summer of 1918 and two armies by the end of the war. The Americans, as Coffman shows, gained the trust of the Allies through successes at Cantigny, Château-Thierry, Belleau Wood, Soissons, and St. Mihiel. These operations paved the way for the culminating American effort in the Meuse-Argonne region. It was only through their performance during the summer of 1918 that Pershing and his Allied Expeditionary Force managed to gain enough trust from the other Allied leaders to be allowed to plan and execute their own operations. The American planned and led final offensive helped to set the conditions for an armistice on Allied terms, thereby providing President Woodrow Wilson with negotiating leverage at the follow-on Paris Peace Conference.
Coffman combines in-depth archival research with rich oral history interviews of living veterans that included AEF staff officers. Perhaps one of his most significant sources, the papers of Hugh Drum, First Army Chief of Staff responsible for planning both the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives, he found in one of Drum’s grandsons’ attic. These papers, along with those in the archives belonging to Secretary of the Army Newton Baker, AEF Commander General John J. Pershing, and others, allowed Coffman to piece together vast portions of American planning and decision-making. Coffman combines primary source documents with visits to the various battle sites to provide a feel for what it must have been like for the average Doughboy preparing to assault Belleau Wood or to attack through the Argonne forest.
Organized chronologically, with separate chapters for naval and aerial contributions, Coffman presents an easily digestible and comprehensive volume on the entire American war effort. More than half of the book describes the tremendous logistical and diplomatic efforts required of the War and Navy Departments to create such vast military forces. Devoting so much space to the pre-war effort is logical, for while the United States was officially at war for nineteen months, large-scale ground combat only occurred for about six months. Coffman’s narrative style immerses the reader in the wartime experience of the AEF and critiques its performance in battle during the summer and autumn of 1918.
Coffman highlights multiple personality conflicts, especially between Pershing and the US Army Chief of Staff, Peyton C. March. While certainly not surprising, reading about their conflict clarifies the origin of many issues within the American Expeditionary Forces. Fortunately for the United States, Secretary of War Baker managed both personalities to ensure Pershing got what he needed at the front.
Initially published in 1968, this book set the standard for subsequent scholarly treatments of the First World War, many of which Coffman admits he wished were available to him in his updated prologue. The War to End All Wars is an inclusive text that explores the entirety of the American experience in the Great War. Particularly important to further research are the author’s insights into personalities and Army institutional culture, and the subsequent impact of these forces on mobilization and the outcome of the war. The work is ideal for anyone requiring an overview of American participation in World War I, scholar and layman alike, due to its story-like readability and comprehensiveness.