Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003)
Mark A. Stoler’s Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II details the complex process of crafting foreign policy and strategy before, during, and after the Second World War. Stoler examines how the Joint Chiefs of Staff influenced strategic policy and foreign relations, while navigating the dynamics of alliance politics during World War II. A professor emeritus at the University of Vermont, Stoler is a preeminent diplomatic historian of the World War II era. The winner of the 2002 Distinguished Book Award from the Society for Military History, this book demonstrates how the Joint Chiefs of Staff came to shape national securirty policy more than any other facet of the United States government.
Stoler writes to answer three research questions: How did the war expand U.S. security requirements? How did the leaders of the armed forces gain such an important role in policy formulation? And how did expanded security requirements and the increased role the armed forces enjoyed dictate U.S. military strategy during World War II?
The author argues that the Joint Chiefs of Staff took on an increasing role in formulating foreign policy because World War II was a global, total war that required a robust coalition and the entirety of American national power. This, along with a decline in State Department influence, placed the military front and center in policy formulation. Stoler argues that despite traditional interpretation to the contrary, the Joint Chiefs were not wary of their newfound power over foreign affairs, but instead welcomed it as they understood the strategic link between politics and operations. Rather than stick to purely military ideas, the Joint Chiefs consistently clamored for clear guidance from civilian leaders while influencing policy that would streamline the prosecution of the war.
The realities of modern warfare and a strong, potentially hegemonic, Soviet Union destroyed American pre-war notions of isolationism and forced the United States to reevaluate its enduring relationship with the United Kingdom. This realization became especially important as the United States realized that cooperation with the Soviets after the war would be troublesome. As Stoler points out, the United States eventually realized it “could not defend the Western Hemisphere against a power that could harness the resources of all Eurasia” and had to accept Britain as a reliable ally. (p. 268) American and British post-war interests, it turns out, were inextricably linked.
Stoler also makes the connection between wartime strategy and decision making at the beginning of the Cold War. The Joint Chiefs made key decisions that shaped the post-war world. The author determines that, “The World War II policies and strategies of the Joint Chiefs were thus not only political, but appropriate for the government and the society those chiefs were sworn to defend.” (p. 270) Evidenced by their realization of Soviet posturing for bases and allies in the war’s aftermath, Stoler concludes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff made prudent decisions about policy and strategy that fit the situation.
Stoler uses archival and manuscripts collections from the United States and Great Britain to analyze how the allies prosecuted politico-military matters. He recreates the magnitude of the situation as the Joint Chiefs make each monumental decision. Stoler clearly illustrates the path American foreign policy decisions took during the Second World War and beyond.
The book’s many acronyms, abbreviations, and code-names make its appendices very helpful, especially for those unversed in military acronyms. The book is organized into thirteen chapters that cover four chronological periods. The first three chapters discuss the period from the First World War through Pearl Harbor. Chapters four through seven discuss the Joint Chief’s strategy efforts in 1942 and 1943 and their inability to settle on a single coherent strategy until midway through the war. Chapters eight through ten discuss the years 1944 and 1945 as U.S. efforts resulted in significant victories over Axis powers and created political leverage. Finally, chapters eleven through thirteen discuss 1945 and beyond as American policymakers decided how to shape post-war foreign policy.
This book advances the idea that the Joint Chiefs not only welcomed the power to make critical foreign policy decisions but insisted on it as well. The extant literature prior to this book maintained that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not desire their new power over foreign affairs, nor were they prepared to accept it. Stoler shows that military leaders understood the Clausewitzian principle of war as “politics by another means” and that politico-military coordination and political judgments by senior military leaders were necessary for the war effort. As Stoler convincingly concludes, the link between politics and the military was all encompassing during the Second World War. This book is most suitable to graduate students, academics, and serious policymakers who seek to understand how the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff came to have greater influence over foreign affairs.