Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, eds., Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (London: Osprey Publishing, 2008)
Overview: Looks at the history of counterinsurgency campaigns as case studies throughout the 20th century. Focuses on how the different strategies were developed and how these strategies did or did not contribute to the ultimate success of failure of the operation.
Central Thesis: Political compromise, ethnic or sectarian divisions, ability to adapt, domestic political situations, and gaps between the aims of government and the aims of insurgents represent themes that arise when studying modern counterinsurgencies.
Scope of Book:.
- Britain, Ireland and Palestine 1916-1948: No official evaluation of counterinsurgency efforts was undertaken, but it should be noted that excessive use of force was counterproductive and accurate intelligence crucial. Constraint was excerised due to British law and not military preference. These campaigns indicate that success or failure rests in political circumstances and not military methods.
- Philippines 1898-1954: Defeating insurgents resulted form isolating them from outside assistance and offering political concessions (Aguinaldo). Preventing outside assistance allowed political reforms and sensible military tactics to defeat the insurgents.
- Banana Wars, Nicaragua 1909-12: US Marines found themselves in a multi-sided conflict protecting American citizens and property but ended up tipping the balance of a local civil war.
- German Anti-Partisan Warfare in WWII: Partisan war in occupied territory was decided by outside factors—namely the front lines. Partisans were never a serious threat to German dominance but were always perceived of and portrayed as a constant threat. The influence of German anti-partisan warfare on Western counterinsurgency after 1945 might be underestimated.
- French Imperial Warfare: Each insurgeny compensated for military weakness by internationalizing its cause. French brutality in Algeria created more insurgents than it contained. French domestic political pressure helped end the occupations. French had no credible political message to sell after WWII and the supposed end of colonialism. French heavy-handed militarized strategy helped perpetuate the insurgency.
- Malaya: Malayan experience demonstrates that a shift in policy from a military drive one to a comprehensive hearts and minds strategy is possible—must include a willingness to learn from mistakes and adapt.
- Vietnam: Individuals attempted to implement change but ran headlong into strong organizational cultures predisposed to a conventional attrition based doctrine.
- Aden: British appetite for a protracted counterinsurgency campaign did not exists, therefore a join political-military solution was unrealistic and the Bitish left the area. The British Army did well, but a purely military operation is not enough.
- Northern Ireland: Moving PIRA’s leadership into dialogue meant protecting its command structure. Political solution was critical to ending the Northern Ireland conflict.
- Rhodesia: Muzorew did not interconnect political and military goals and thus had a failed fragmented strategy.
- Israel: Kinetic strategy is untenable, especially if counterinsurgents view it as war—Failing to address political realities and relying too heavily on a military solution feeds into a tit-for-tat escalatory process that prolongs insurgencies.
- Afghanistan: A desire for quick solutions and fundamental misunderstanding of the complexities of Afghanistan led to encouragement of an insurgency. Main problems in 2003-2007 years was the decentralization of responsibility among so many NATO/ISAF nations. This chapter was written in 2007 so the jury is still out…
- Iraq: The key elements of US strategy did not placate the Sunni minority and thus led to robust insurgency. Iraq highlights the effect that social or political constraints, in this case the sectarian divide, have on the success of attempts to adapt.