Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991)
Biography: Omer Bartov is the John P. Birkelund Distinguished Professor of European History and Professor of German Studies at Brown University. He was educated at Tel Aviv University and St. Antony’s College, Oxford. He is one of the preeminent scholars on the Eastern Front in World War II, as well as more recent writings about total war’s relation to genocide.
Overview: In Hitler’s Army Bartov explores the relationship between the Wehrmacht and the society and institutions of the Third Reich. He challenges the notion that atrocities on the Eastern Front were purely the responsibility of the SS by showing that the Wehrmacht was an integral part of the Nazi regime. The Wehrmacht was not forced to obey the Nazi’s, nor was it misled, but rather it was part of the atrocities. In effect he challenges three myths: 1) that the German army were ordinary men misused. 2) That German atrocities were balanced by Soviet ones. 3) That their actions are divorced from the horrors of National Socialism.
Thesis: Bartov argues instead that the Germany army internalized and implemented the ideology of National Socialism in a genocidal war. Far from being the modern mechanized force of myth, the Germany army progressively demodernized during the course of the war which forced German soldiers to rely on their fighting spirit, which was fueled by National Socialism and sustained by a harsh disciplinary system.
Scope of Book:
- Demonstrates that the traditional view of a German Army held together by primary groups preoccupied with survival and loyalty is more myth than reality.
- Instead large numbers of conscripts joined the ranks as casualties mounted and therefore Nazi ideology played a larger role than most historians had espoused until that point.
- Nazi ideology portrayed the war as a struggle for survival against the dehumanized Bolsheviks which helped indoctrinate conscripts into the mindset of atrocity.
- Bartov also challenges broader primary group research by arguing that German soldiers fought ferociously despite the destruction of their primary groups within the first 9 months of the war.
- Problems in supply soon followed and deficiencies in supply, due to the short war fallacy, and were exasperated by the harsh Russian weather.
- Improvisations were primitive, and the soldiers became apathetic which led to breakdowns in command,.
- Describes a German army that went through “demodernization” when its equipment was lost, they were forced to live off of the Russian economy and directed to spare none of its provisions for civilians or prisoners. The need to live in austerity, reliant on only each other which made that army culturally prepared for the ruthlessness it is now known for.
- Nazi ideology fostered racial demonization of the enemy, which, when balanced by the deification of the Führer generated barbaric atrocities and a blind faith in the Fatherland.
- By March 1945 Wehrmacht casualties were more than double the original number that invaded.
- Bartov concludes that the army’s cohesion came from its harsh discipline and a view among soldiers that they were indeed defending western culture against a barbaric invasion from the east and that it was an all-or-nothing struggle.
Methods and Organization: Four roughly equal digestible chapters and requisite intro and conclusion. Well written, easy to gut and find information needed. Chapter 1 talks about the demodernization effort at the front. Chapter 2 discusses the destruction of the primary group. Chapter 3 how discipline became so Draconian. And Chapter 4 discusses how all of this introduced into the cauldron of the Eastern Front created an especially ruthless and fanatical army.
Commentary: Because National Socialism as a system of government had only existed for 8 years by the time Hitler’s Army marched into Russia, it probably played a secondary role. Instead, Germany was much underdeveloped compared to the United States and could only provide nominal mechanization so the Germans emphasized character and courage. Also, primary groups reform all the time when they break down. Overall this is an excellent examination of how culture forms and reforms, the factors that can influence its change in a relatively quick amount of time. This is an impressive book despite its criticisms. To pack so much useful information into 238 pages with notes is all the more impressive. Must read.